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Judicial Federalism and Supreme Court Review of
State Court Decisions: A Sensible Balance
Emerges
David A. Schlueter*
Introduction
With the advent of the more conservative Burger Court, com-
mentators' and Supreme Court Justices2 alike have reminded state
courts that they are free to exercise final authority as arbiters of state
law and adopt state standards that protect individual rights more
than federal law. While state courts have responded to such urgings
with expansive rulings, they have not always been careful about
spelling out in their decisions whether they were relying on state law,
federal law, or both. This judicial imprecision creates a jurisdictional
dilemma for the Supreme Court when it is asked to review the state
court decision.
* Associate Dean and Associate Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law.
B.A., 1969, Texas A & M University; J.D., 1971, Baylor University School of Law; LL.M.,
1981, University of Virginia. Dean Schlueter served as Legal Officer to the Supreme Court of
the United States from 1981 to 1983.
1 See, e.g., Aldisert, State Courts andFederalism in the 1980"r: Comment, 22 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 821 (1981); Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 605 (1981); Countryman, Why a State Bill ofRighs?, 45 WASH. L. REV. 454 (1970); Falk,
The State Constitution" A More Than "Adequate"Nonfederal Ground, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 273 (1973);
Fleming & Nordby, The Minesota Bill of Rights: "Wrapt in the Old Miasmal Mist," 7 HAMLINE
L. REV. 51 (1984); Force, State "Bills of Rights'" A Case of Neglect and The Needfor a Renaissance,
3 VAL. U.L. REv. 125 (1969); Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the
Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873 (1976); Linde, E Pluribus-Constitutional Theory and State
Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 165 (1984); Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bill of
Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REv. 379 (1980); Note, Stepping Into the Breach: Basing Defendants'Rights
on State Rather Than Federal Law, 15 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 339 (1978); Note, State Constitutional
Guarantees as Adequate State Ground Supreme Court Review and Problems of Federalism, 13 Am.
CRIM. L. REV. 737 (1976); Note, Rediscovering the California Declaration of Rights, 26 HASTINGS
LJ. 481 (1974).
2 See, e.g., South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S. Ct. 916, 924-27 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 111-21 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Oregon v. Hass, 420
U.S. 714, 726-29 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of
IndividualRights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the
Federal and State Courts flom the Perspective of a State Courtjudge, 22 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 801
(1981). At least one commentator has criticized dissenting Justices for using their judicial
opinions to encourage states to employ more expansive state law. See Bator, supra note 1, at
605 n.1.
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If the state decision rests on independent and adequate state
grounds, the Court will apply its self-imposed rule of judicial re-
straint and will decline review. 3 But the task of determining whether
there is such a ground in the state court's decision is not always easy.
Last term in Michzgan v. Long,4 the Court noted this problem and
announced a new rule. Unless it clearly appears on the face of the
state court's decision that it relied on independent and adequate
state grounds, the Supreme Court will assume that no such grounds
were present.
This case marks an important milestone in the Burger Court's
so-called "new federalism," a policy which advocates greater defer-
ence to state courts' autonomy. The new rule is another in a series of
attempts by the Court to strike a workable and delicate balance be-
tween the state courts' autonomy and the Supreme Court's role as
final arbiter of federal law. This article examines that balance from
both a theoretical and practical perspective.
Section I explores the underlying theories of Supreme Court re-
view of state court decisions and the Court's self-imposed rule of re-
straint where the state decision rests on nonfederal grounds. Section
I also examines the various avenues the Court uses to dispose of am-
biguous state decisions where it is not clear whether those decisions
are in fact based upon independent and adequate state grounds.
Section II briefly reviews the holding in Michzgan v. Long. It then
measures that holding against the Court's oft-stated need to respect
state courts' autonomy, the need for uniformity in federal law, and
the need to avoid advisory opinions. Section III discusses the various
recent state court responses to the Burger Court's view of federalism;
it also offers some practical notes, both for state courts and counsel,
in meeting the rule. Finally, Section IV addresses the perceived and
actual impact of Long on state criminal defendants.
I. Supreme Court Review of State Court Decisions: An Overview
The general authority for Supreme Court appellate review of
state court decisions rests in the broad language of article III, section
1 of the Constitution, which vests the judicial power of the United
States in the Supreme Court (and in other inferior courts established
by Congress), 5 and in article III, section 2, which extends that power
to cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United
3 Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945); see text accompanying notes 23-26 infia.
4 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983).
5 U.S. CONST art. III, § 1.
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States. 6 Through the years, Congress has further defined and refined
the scope of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. The con-
temporary template for review of federal court decisions is laid out in
28 U.S.C. § 1254;7 the Court's authority with regard to reviewing
state court decisions is located in 28 U.S.C. § 1257.8 Both provisions
broadly address the circumstances under which an appeal may be
taken to the Court and when the Court may exercise discretionary
review through a writ of certiorari.9
These constitutional and statutory schemes for Supreme Court
review reflect the original understanding that there would be two
concurrent judicial systems in the new Republic-one state, the
other federal.' 0 An inherent tension, however, exists between these
6 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
7 (1976). This section provides:
Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by the
following methods:
(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any civil or
criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree;
(2) By appeal by a party relying on a State statute held by a court of appeals to
be invalid as repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States,
but such appeal shall preclude review by writ of certiorari at the instance of such
appellant, and the review on appeal shall be restricted to the Federal questions
presented;
(3) By certification at any time by a court of appeals of any question of law in
any civil or criminal case as to which instructions are desired, and upon such certifi-
cation the Supreme Court may give binding instructions or require the entire record
to be sent up for decision of the entire matter in controversy.
8 (1976). This section provides that:
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a
decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows:
(1) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of
the United States and the decision is against its validity.
(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state
on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the
United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity.
(3) By writ of certiorari, where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United
States is drawn in question or where the validity of a State statute is drawn in
question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of
the United States, or where any title, right, privilege or immunity is specially set up
or claimed under the Constitution, treaties or statutes of, or commission held or
authority exercised under, the United States.
9 The Supreme Court's rules address the actual procedural framework for pursuing
either the appellate or certiorari routes. See Sup. CT. R. 10, 19. For a discussion of considera-
tions in determining which route to take, assuming counsel has a choice, see R. STERN & E.
GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 168-172 (5th ed. 1978).
10 See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 114 (1978)(The Constitution
"presumes the existence of the states as lawmakers and governmental institutions distinct
from the federal government."); see aso THE FEDERALIST, No. 82 (A. Hamilton) (state courts
have concurrent powers unless prohibited).
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two individual systems." To ensure that state court autonomy might
remain firm and respected, the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court may be exercised over state courts only where the Constitution
or federal treaties or statutes are drawn into question.' 2
Despite this salutary framework, the Supreme Court's impact on
the state courts and their cases has taken a number of sweeping turns,
both as a result of congressional action and as a result of a sometimes
activist Court. For example, the federal habeas corpus statute has
provided a well-traveled avenue for state criminal defendants to
challenge state court convictions in the lower federal courts, and ulti-
mately in the Supreme Court.14 Another example is the Court's "in-
corporation" cases which have required state courts to apply various
Bill of Rights protections to state criminal defendants through the
fourteenth amendment. These and similar cases have provided the
seeds for the Court's reevaluation both of its relationship with state
courts, and of the manner in which it exercises its jurisdiction over
those courts.
A. The Efects of the Incorporation Doctrine
Once planted in contemporary jurisprudence, the idea that the
fourteenth amendment incorporated other specific Bill of Rights'
protections quickly gained strength. Now, all but a few of the Bill of
Rights' protections have been specifically applied to state criminal
proceedings.' 5 The concept of selective incorporation, however, as
well as the Warren Court's far-reaching criminal procedure deci-
sions, was initially resisted by many legal scholars and judges, includ-
11 See generally M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION
OF JUDICIAL POWER (1980) for materials covering a wide range of potential tensions in the
two systems.
12 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
13 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976).
14 Once the state criminal defendant enters the federal judicial system through a habeas
corpus petition, he may potentially pursue his federal remedies to the Supreme Court through
either an appeal or writ of certiorari. He must first exhaust his state remedies, however.
Ironically, his state appeals may have initially resulted in a denial of plenary review by the
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
15 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)(trial by jury in a criminal case); Washing-
ton v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967)(compulsory process for witnesses); Klopfer v. North Caro-
lina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967)(speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)(confrontation of
witnesses); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)(self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963)(right to counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)(fourth amendment
exclusionary rule); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (public trial). To date the Court has not
made the bail clause of the eighth amendment or the right to grand jury indictment in the
fifth amendment applicable to state criminal proceedings.
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ing state court judges. 16 These judges were understandably disturbed
at the prospect of the Supreme Court federalizing state affairs.17 The
Supreme Court placed the state courts in the position of having to
decide an increasing number of federal constitutional challenges to
state criminal procedures.' 8 Because the vast majority of criminal
prosecutions in this country are conducted in the state courts,1 9 the
Supreme Court's expansion of the Bill of Rights protections into state
courts provided a bumper crop of litigants seeking direct and collat-
eral review of state criminal convictions in the Supreme Court.
The mere fact that a state court addressed a Bill of Rights ques-
tion in a particular case, however, does not necessarily require the
Supreme Court to exercise its plenary powers. The state court judg-
ment must have involved a substantial federal question, 20 and the
decision must not have been based on a nonfederal ground. While
this latter element has served as a check on runaway Supreme Court
intervention, it has become a prime source of frustration for the
Court in deciding whether to exercise its jurisdiction.
B. The Court-s Rule of Self Restraint. Independent and Adequate
State Grounds
The genesis of the Court's "independent and adequate state
ground" rule is generally considered to lie in Murdock v. City of Mem-
phzs. 2' In that case, the Court held that presence of a federal ques-
tion in a state court decision did not empower the Supreme Court to
decide state (or nonfederal) issues; if there was a state ground that
sufficiently supported the judgment, the Supreme Court declined to
16 See Sheran, State Courts andFederalism in the 1980s: Comment, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV.
789 (1981). The author, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota, notes that the
response was "hostile and defensive." Id. at 791.
17 Whether one views the Court's expansive rulings as right or wrong is irrelevant here.
What is important is the impact these decisions had on state courts.
18 Indeed, any trial lawyer would have been remiss in not raising challenges at the state
trial level on both state and federal grounds. See Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 579
(1979) (Powell, J., concurring); see also O'Connor, supra note 2, at 802.
19 See 7 STATE CT. J. 18 (1983), cited byJustice O'Connor in Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct.
3469, 3477 n.8 (1983). That journal indicates that in 1982 over 12 million criminal actions,
excluding traffic and juvenile violations, were filed in the state courts. In contrast, 32,700
criminal actions were filed in federal courts in the same period. Annual Report of the Direc-
tor of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 6 (1982).
20 The term "federal question" was apparently first used in Murdock v. City of Mem-
phis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875); see Note, Supreme Court Review fState Court Decisions Involv-
ing Multiple Questions, 95 U. PA. L. REv. 764 (1947).
21 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
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exercise jurisdiction over the case.22 The rationale supporting this
self-imposed limitation was more clearly spelled out in Herb v. Pit-
cairn23 where the Court stated:
This Court from the time of its foundation has adhered to the
principle that it will not review judgments of state courts that rest
on adequate and independent state grounds. The reason is so ob-
vious that it has rarely been thought to warrant statement. It is
found in the partitioning of power between the state and federal
judicial systems and in the limitations of our own jurisdiction.
Our only power over state judgments is to correct them to the
extent that they incorrectly adjudge federal rights. And our
power is to correct wrong judgments, not to revise opinions. We
are not permitted to render an advisory opinion, and if the same
judgment would be rendered by the state court after we corrected
its views of federal laws, our review could amount to nothing
more than an advisory opinion. 24
Thus, the two primary reasons for the Court's self-imposed limitation
are its respect for state courts25 and its reluctance to issue advisory
opinions which would not be binding on the state courts.2 6
The rationale for this rule is sound not only in a constitutional
sense, but also from a practical viewpoint. Unfortunately, the
Court's application of this rule has been neither consistent nor man-
ageable. The application problem can be attributed to two things:
deciding what constitutes an independent and adequate state
ground, and disposing of those cases where it is not clear whether the
state court's decision in fact rests on such a ground.
1. What is an Independent and Adequate State Ground?
Deciding whether a state court decision was based on a suffi-
ciently broad nonfederal ground generally involves two separate de-
terminations: whether the state decision was grounded on independent
state law, and, if so, whether that law was adequate to support the
judgment. Sometimes, however, the court intertwines these two de-
terminations in its analysis of a case.
The simplest, and perhaps rarest, case arises when the state
court plainly states that it is resting its decision solely on a state
22 Id. at 635-36.
23 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
24 Id. at 125-26 (citations omitted).
25 See text accompanying notes 92-96 infia.
26 See text accompanying notes 131-39 infra.
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ground, i.e., on an interpretation of the state's constitution. 27 How-
ever, where the court's decision appears to rest on both federal and
state grounds, the Supreme Court must determine to what extent the
state court actually relied on either or both grounds.28 Moreover, the
fact that the state court's decisions might have rested on a nonfederal
ground will normally not be sufficient in itself to defeat Supreme
Court jurisdiction. 29
Assuming that the state court's decision was based on an identi-
fiable, independent state ground, the Supreme Court must then de-
termine if that independent state ground was adequate to support that
decision. Again, the easiest case is where the state court has specifi-
cally declared a state statute or regulation invalid under the provi-
sions of the state constitution.30 However, where the federal and
state grounds are intertwined, the Court must sort and measure.
Measured alone, the nonfederal ground must be broad enough to
support the state court's judgment.31
The Court is watchful for state grounds which are apparently
contrived or arbitrary and are designed to frustrate the litigation of
federal issues.32 This sort of problem generally arises when a state
has interposed a state procedural rule as a hurdle for resolving fed-
eral issues. As the Supreme Court noted in Hengy v. Aisszsbpi, 33 the
state procedural ground will not be considered adequate unless it
serves a legitimate state interest. 34
If a state court decision is based upon an independent and ade-
quate state ground, the Supreme Court will generally decline plenary
review. 35 But it does not follow that the absence of a nonfederal
ground will ensure plenary review. The petitioner or appellant must
also demonstrate that the state court decision presents a substantial
27 See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972).
28 Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.S. 765, 773 (1931). For example, where a state court
relied on fourth amendment principles and referred repeatedly to Supreme Court and lower
federal court decisions in the area, it is not likely that perfunctory statements that the state's
constitution required the same result would be an independent state ground. See, e.g., Michigan
v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983).
29 Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 37 n.3 (1967).
30 People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. denied, 406
U.S. 958 (1972).
31 Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
32 See generalfy R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 9, at 239-44.
33 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
34 Id. at 447. See generaly Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground.-
Proposals for a Revised Doctrine, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 187.
35 Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935).
[Vol. 59:1079]
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federal question.3 6 Even then, other hurdles, such as lack of jus-
ticiability, may stand in the way of federal review.3 7 Thus, even in
an appeal, plenary review is not guaranteed.38
2. Deciding Whether a Nonfederal Ground Exists: An Exercise
in Frustration
In most state cases filed in the Supreme Court, the question of
whether there is or is not an independent and adequate state ground
for the state court's decision is normally clear-cut. But, in a signifi-
cant number of decisions the matter is not so clear. In the typically
ambiguous case, the state court will have focused almost exclusively
on federal decisional law and then concluded that the result it
reached was required under both federal and state law.39 In that sort
of case, does the state court judgment rest on an independent and
adequate state ground? In some cases it does not matter because
some other jurisdictional hurdle, such as the absence of a substantial
federal question, already bars plenary review. However, in other
cases the issue of whether the state court decision rested on
nonfederal grounds is critical. In such cases the court has generally
relied on three methods of determining the basis of the state court's
decision.
Option One.- Examine State Law. Where the state court's decision
cites state law, the Court may attempt to determine what the state
law is and whether the court below in fact relied upon it for resolu-
tion of the case.40 The problem with this option is that the state
courts are in the best position to say what the state law is and how it
has been applied.41 Thus, in deciphering the applicable state law the
Court risks misinterpreting the law and offending the state court.
Furthermore, this task is time consuming and burdensome for the
Court, particularly since the Court must engage in this analysis to
36 See R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 9, at 208-30 for a discussion of what consti-
tutes a substantial federal question and how one goes about presenting it.
37 See genera/ly L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 52-112.
38 Sometimes plenary review pursuant to an "appeal" is expected as a matter of right, as
distinguished from discretionary review under a writ of certiorari. But even in an appeal
from a state or federal court, the Supreme Court will exercise its plenary jurisdiction spar-
ingly. The merits of the appeal will be considered, but in most cases the Supreme Court will
dispose of the appeal by summarily affirming or reversing federal court decisions or dismissing
state court decisions "for want of a substantial federal question."
39 See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983).
40 See, e.g., Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983) (plurality opinion); Oregon v. Ken-
nedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982).
41 Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3475 (1983); see also Note, Stepping Into the Breach:
Basing Defendants' Rights on State Rather Than Federal Law, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 339 (1978).
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determine whether it even has jurisdiction. 42
Option Two. Ask the State Court. The safest way to decide
whether the nonfederal ground is independent and adequate is to
remand the case to the state court that rendered the decision. In
effect, the Court either vacates43 or continues44 the case until the
state court, on remand, has had an opportunity to clarify its position.
Although effective, this option is time consuming for the state court45
and can be viewed as demonstrating a lack of respect and confidence
in the state court's decision. 46
Option Three.: Dismiss the Case. Where there is doubt as to the
basis of the state court's decision, the Supreme Court may simply
dismiss the case, concluding that the court below did rest its decision
on independent and adequate state grounds.47 Under this option,
there is little risk of offending the state court, and neither court
wastes its time in reviewing the decision. But there is a real risk that
this option might cause a lack of uniformity in federal law, especially
where it might just as safely be concluded that the state decision
rested primarily on federal grounds. 48
None of these options has proved entirely satisfactory. To fur-
ther complicate matters, in some instances the nonfederal ground is-
sue may not be raised or highlighted until the parties file their briefs
on the merits49 or present oral argument.50 In those instances, the
42 If the Court decides that it has jurisdiction and grants plenary review, it runs a further
risk that the state court, on remand, may evade the Court's holding on the federal issues by
explaining that its first decision was indeed based on independent and adequate state
grounds. In that situation, the Court has arguably rendered a nonbinding, advisory opinion.
See text accompanying notes 131-39 infra.
43 See, e.g., Montana v. Jackson, 103 S. Ct. 1418 (1983); Minnesota v. National Tea Co.,
309 U.S. 551 (1940). See generaly Note, supra note 20, at 773-75.
44 Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
45 Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3475 (1983); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v.
Jerome, 434 U.S. 241, 244 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Department of Motor Vehicles v.
Rios, 410 U.S. 425, 427 (1973)(Douglas, J., dissenting).
46 In Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 128 (1945), the Court recognized that it is more
desirable that state courts be asked, rather than told, what they meant. But in State v. Jack-
son, 672 P.2d 255 (Mont. 1983)(on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court for reconsideration
of the state court's decision), the dissenting opinions expressed displeasure that the Court had
intervened in the state court's affairs. Id. at 260-64; see text accompanying notes 180-94 infia;
see also Dixon v. Duffy, 344 U.S. 143 (1952) (Supreme Court of California advised counsel for
the petitioner that it doubted whether it had jurisdiction to reconsider its earlier decision).
47 See Lynch v. New York, 293 U.S. 52 (1934).
48 Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3475 (1983); Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309
U.S. 551, 556 (1940); see text accompanying notes 119-30 infra.
49 See Sup. CT. R. 34. Note that petitioners and appellants are supposed to address the
issue ofjurisdiction in their petition for certiorari, Sup. CT. R. 21, or jurisdictional statements,
Sup. CT. R. 15. However, neither rule specifically requires the parties to address the issue of
[Vol. 59:1079]
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Court will dismiss the case 5' if it decides that nonfederal grounds
were indeed the basis of the state court's decision.
On the whole, the problems associated with fair and consistent
treatment of ambiguous state court decisions have understandably
provided a source of frustration for the Court. From the Court's per-
spective, it was clearly an unsatisfactory condition growing worse.
This sense of dissatisfaction gave impetus to the Court's rule in Michi-
gan v. Long.5
2
II. The New Plain Statement Rule: Showing Respect For State
Courts
A. Michigan v. Long- A New Option
In Michigan v. Long,53 the Court addressed the question of
whether police officers who have stopped a vehicle may conduct a
Terry v. Ohio5 4 protective search of the vehicle's interior. The Michi-
gan Supreme Court had held that drugs seized during the search of
Long's car were inadmissible because the sole justification for a Terry-
protective search, protection of police officers and bystanders, was
insufficient justification for the search., 5 The Michigan court relied
heavily on its reading of federal law but made two brief references to
the Michigan Constitution.56 The Supreme Court granted the state's
petition for certiorari57 and reversed, concluding that under the
fourth amendment a protective search of the interior of a vehicle was
justified.58 That conclusion is in itself noteworthy. But, more impor-
tantly from the perspective of federal-state relations is the Court's
whether an independent state ground is present; the focus is on whether a federal question has
been presented.
50 In Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983), zhe issue was also addressed in questions
from the bench. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 30. Normally, the oral argument does
not take place until months after the Court decides to take jurisdiction; by then, the parties
and the Court have spent considerable time on the case.
51 See Sup. CT. R. 53 (Dismissing Causes); Florida v. Casal, 103 S. Ct. 3100 (1983) (per
curiam dismissal of case as improvidently granted).
52 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983).
53 Id.
54 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
55 People v. Long, 413 Mich. 461, 472, 320 N.W.2d 866, 869 (1982).
56 413 Mich. at 471 n.4, 320 N.W.2d at 869 n.4; 413 Mich. at 472-73, 320 N.W.2d at 870
("We hold, therefore, that the deputies' search of the vehicle was proscribed by the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 1, § 11 of the Michigan
Constitution.").
57 103 S. Ct. 205 (1982).
58 Id. at 3481-82.
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new framework for examining future cases when it is not clear that
there are independent and adequate state grounds.
Writing for the majority, 59 Justice O'Connor traced the Court's
struggles with deciding whether nonfederal grounds exist and can-
didly admitted that the Court had been unable to develop a "satisfy-
ing and consistent approach for resolving this vexing issue."'60
Identifying the various options used by the Court and expressing dis-
satisfaction with each, 61 Justice O'Connor next reiterated that the
cornerstones of the Court's refusal to decide state cases where ade-
quate nonfederal grounds for the decision exist are respect for the
independence of state courts and avoidance of rendering advisory
opinions.62 The Court does not wish to continue to decide what the
state law is or to require the state courts to reconsider and clarify
their decisions. Justice O'Connor stated:
Accordingly, when, as in this case, a state court decision fairly
appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with
the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of
any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the
opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that
the state court decided the case the way it did because it believed
that federal law required it to do so. If a state court chooses
merely to rely on federal precedents as it would on the precedents
of all other jurisdictions, then it need only make clear by a plain
statement in its judgment or opinion that the federal cases are
being used only for the purpose of guidance, and do not them-
selves compel the result that the court has reached. In this way,
both justice and judicial administration will be greatly improved.
If the state court decision indicates clearly and expressly that it is
alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and in-
dependent grounds, we, of course, will not undertake to review
the decision. 63
The majority in Long offered several justifications for this new rule.
59 Justice O'Connor was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices White, Powell, and
Rehnquist.
60 103 S. Ct. at 3474.
61 Id. at 3474-75; see text accompanying notes 40-48 supra.
62 103 S. Ct. at 3475.
63 Id. at 3476. Justice O'Connor foretold the new rule in a speech to the National Judi-
cial College, Reno, Nevada, on May 13, 1983:
There is a fine line, of course, between a state court holding that an action
independently violates both the State and Federal Constitutions, and holding that
the State Constitution is violated because the Federal Constitution is violated. Re-
cently, there has been a tendency for the Supreme Court to find no independent
state ground and to assert its power to review if it appears that both federal and
state constitutional provisions are cited by the state court, that the state cases gener-
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First, in most cases the new approach will eliminate the need to ex-
amine state law and preclude the possibility of giving an advisory
opinion.64 Second, the rule dispenses with the intrusive practice of
asking the state courts what they meant. 65 This would in turn en-
courage state courts to develop state law unimpeded by federal inter-
vention.66 Third, the Court noted that it was not unusual for it to
use certain presumptions in determining jurisdictional issues. As an
example, it cited the rule that once the Court takes jurisdiction, there
is a presumption that it has jurisdiction until proven otherwise. 67
Using this new "framework," the Court concluded that the
Michigan Supreme Court's decision was not based upon an in-
dependent and adequate state ground.6 8 It appeared to the Court
that the Michigan court had felt compelled by its understandings of
federal constitutional law to construe its state law in the manner it
did.69 The Court added in a footnote, however, that even if it were
to rely on the abandoned method of examining state law, it would
reach the same conclusion because applicable Michigan law was in
turn based upon federal constitutional considerations. 70
Not all of the justices, however, agreed that the Court should use
ally follow the federal interpretation, and the state court does not clearly and ex-
pressly articulate its separate reliance on independent state grounds.
The point of this discussion is to emphasize that, as state court judges, you have
a very real power to decide cases, whether they are civil or criminal, on state
grounds alone, if they exist, or to indicate clearly and expressly that the decision is
alternatively based on separate and independent state grounds . . . . [citations
omitted].
64 103 S. Ct. at 3476. The Court, however, cautioned that there may be times when it
would be necessary or desirable to take appropriate action to clarify the state court's decision.
103 S. Ct. at 3476 n.6. The Court recently did just that in Capital Cities Media, Inc. v.
Toole, 104 S. Ct. 2144 (1984). The petitioners were barred by the respondent, a trial judge,
from covering and reporting on certain aspects of a criminal trial. They subsequently filed a
writ of prohibition in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court; that court denied relief without opin-
ion. Because the record did not indicate whether the state court relied upon federal or state
grounds, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the state court "for such further proceed-
ings as it may deem appropriate to clarify the record." Id.
65 103 S. Ct. at 3476.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 3477 n.8; see County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979).
68 103 S. Ct. at 3478.
69 Id; see also Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1540 n.3 (1983); Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 653 (1979); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 568 (1977).
In other words, a state-law ground is not sufficiently independent if it appears that the state
court felt compelled to interpret its own law in terms of what it understood the federal Consti-
tution to require. On the other hand, if the state court merely found federal precedent per-
suasive, as it would any other authority, then the state ground will probably be
"independent."
70 103 S. Ct. at 3478 n.10.
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this new "framework" in determining whether state court decisions
were based on nonfederal grounds. In a brief concurring opinion,
Justice Blackmun agreed that the Court had jurisdiction in Long, but
could not join in "fashioning a new presumption of jurisdiction over
cases coming here from state courts."'71 Despite his agreement that
"uniformity in federal criminal law is desirable," he saw little effi-
ciency in the new rule and an increased danger that the new ap-
proach would lead to rendering advisory opinions. 72
Surprisingly, Justice Brennan, 73 one of the Justices who has long
reminded state courts of their important and front-line role in forg-
ing protections for individual rights,7 4 focused his dissent on the
Court's disposition of the Teny protective search holding rather than
on the jurisdictional issue.75 Instead of explicitly supporting the new
jurisdictional framework, he merely cited a footnote from the major-
ity's opinion,76 stating that there is nothing unfair about the plain
statement rule and detailing why, even under an examination of
Michigan law, the court would still have jurisdiction.7 7 Although it
could be argued that Justice Brennan was endorsing the new rule, a
more conservative conclusion is that he preferred only to rest his find-
ing of jurisdiction on an examinaton of state law and avoid any for-
mal alliance with the "assumption" rule.7'
Noting that the search and seizure issues were less 'important
than the Court's new jurisdictional rule,79 Justice Stevens provided a
spirited challenge to the rule on several fronts. He first concluded
that the Michigan Supreme Court's decision demonstrated that its
reliance on the Michigan Constitution was clearly adequate to support
its judgment.8 0 While he recognized the difficulty of deciding
71 Id. at 3483 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
72 Id.
73 Justice Brennan was joined by Justice Marshall.
74 See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protections of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV.
489 (1977); Brennan, State Court Decisions and the Supreme Court, 31 PA. B. A. Q. 393 (1960).
75 103 S. Ct. at 3483-89 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Only in a footnote did Justice Brennan
agree that the Court had jurisdiction to hear the case. Id. at 3483 n. 1.
76 Id. at 3483 n. 1 (citing the opinion of the Court at 3478 n. 10).
77 Id. at 3478 n.10.
78 Also noteworthy is the fact that Justice Brennan did not join in Justice Stevens' view
that the Supreme Court has no business reviewing cases in which the defendant's federal
rights have been vindicated. However, in Florida v. Meyers, 104 S. Ct. 1852, 1854 (1984) (per
curiam) (Stevens, J., dissenting), Justices Brennan and Marshall joined Justice Stevens in
criticizing the Court for the manner in which it handles state court decisions, especially its
propensity to review state cases which have vindicated a federal right.
79 103 S. Ct. at 3489 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80 Id. Although Justice Stevens found the grounds adequate, he did not explicitly state
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whether the state ground was independent he noted that four options
are available to the Court to decide this question. The Court can ask
the state court what it meant, it can attempt to decide what the state
law is, or it can use one of two presumptions. First, it can presume
that adequate state grounds are independent unless it clearly appears
otherwise. Or, it can presume (as the Court did in this case) that the
state grounds are not independent unless it clearly appears
otherwise.8'
Justice Stevens found the first two options defensible but could
not endorse the Court's selection of the second presumption (for juris-
diction) when precedent supported using the first presumption
against jurisdiction.8 2 In his view, the presumption favoring the
Court's exercise of its plenary powers would be inconsistent with
avoidance of rendering advisory opinions and respect for state courts.
Further, in his view, all the members of the Court would agree that
scarce federal judicial resources must be carefully managed.8 3 An ex-
pansive attitude towards jurisdiction, therefore, did not make good
sense.
84
Justice Stevens also commented on what he envisioned as the
narrow role of the Supreme Court in the state-federal judicial
scheme. Just as American courts have no cause to intervene in Finn-
ish judicial matters where no American has been unfairly tried or
that they were also independent. The focus of his dissent was not so much on this case as on
the Court's decision to assume the absence of such grounds.
81 Id; see also, Note, State Constitutional Guarantees as Adequate State Ground- Supreme Court
Review and Problems of Federalism, 13 AM. CRIM. L REv. 737, 759 (1976)(the author suggests
that when the grounds for the state court's decision are mixed, the Court could hold that no
independent state grounds exist); Bice, Anderson and the Adequate State Ground, 45 S. CAL. L.
REv. 750, 760 (1972)(the author proposes that the Court should always review ambiguous
state decisions).
82 Justice Stevens relied on Lynch v. New York, 293 U.S. 52 (1934). However, the grava-
men in Lynch was the petitioner's failure to establish that the state decision rested on a sub-
stantial federal question. The state decision merely cited the fourteenth amendment, and the
grounds of the state court's decision were unclear.
83 103 S. Ct. at 3490. Justice Stevens' comments touch the heart of a practical problem
which concerns the Court: an ever-increasing docket. Most of the justices have publicly ex-
pressed concern about that problem, and some have offered proposals for change. See, e.g.,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1983, at Al, col. 5. (Chief Justice Burger recommends special appellate
court to address certain cases from federal circuit courts); id., Nov. 19, 1983, at Bl, col. 1.; id.,
Aug. 15, 1982, at E9, col. 2.
84 Justice Stevens may have overestimated the ultimate effect of the new rule on the size
of the docket. Arguably, the rule does not actually expand the Court's jurisdiction, but is
designed to assist the Court in dealing with future ambiguous state decisions. If the state
courts respond to the Supreme Court's prodding by clarifying whether they are relying on
state grounds, fewer cases may find their way into the Court. See text accompanying notes
210-14 inia.
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convicted,8 5 the Supreme Court has no cause to intervene in cases in
which no federal right has been denied. In reviewing state court
opinions, the primary role of the Court is to ensure that persons seek-
ing vindication of federal rights86 have been fairly heard.87
Justice Stevens also did not agree that the Court's new rule is
needed to ensure uniformity in federal law.88 That same need is pres-
ent, he pointed out, when the state court's decision clearly rests on an
independent and adequate state ground. Yet the Court has declined
to intervene no matter how egregious that state court's reasoning.8 9
85 Justice Stevens expressed bewilderment that the majority must stretch its jurisdiction
and reverse the Michigan Supreme Court to show respect for it. Again referring to Finnish
courts, he questioned whether the Court would show respect for Finland by presupposing to
tell it how to interpret American law. 103 S. Ct. at 3490 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
86 Id. Justice Stevens found support for this narrow view in earlier decisions that refer to
the Court's role in protecting federal rights. See Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.S. 765, 773
(1931); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 248 U.S. 67, 70 (1918). He cites no
recent persuasive authority, however, for the proposition that vindication of federal rights is the
sole purpose of Supreme Court review.
Before 1914, Justice Stevens' view was reflected in the Court's statutory authority to
review state decisions. The Judiciary Act of 1789, Ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 83 (1789), limited
Supreme Court review of state decisions to those cases in which a federal right had been
denied. However, a New York case, Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431
(1911), expanding the federal due process clause, prompted congressional action. See generally
Dodd, The United States Supreme Court as the Final Interpreter of the Federal Constitution, 6 ILL. L.
REV. 289 (1911). In 1914, Supreme Court review was extended to include state cases Sur-
taiing a federal claim. See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BusINEss OF THE SUPREME
COURT 188-98 (1928). The amendment is now reflected in 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3)(1976). See
note 8 supra.
87 Justice Stevens noted that recently the Court's docket has swollen with requests by
state officials to review state court decisions that have vindicated individual rights. In his
estimation, this is a misallocation of resources. He repeated that concern recently in Florida
v. Meyers, 104 S. Ct. 1852, 1854 (1984) (per curiam) (Stevens, J., dissenting), where the Court
summarily reversed a Florida state court opinion. As Justice O'Connor pointed out in the
majority opinion in Afichigan v. Long, the sheer number of state criminal actions would ac-
count for an increased number of state cases addressing federal law and thus potentially re-
quiring Supreme Court review. 103 S. Ct. at 3477 n.8.
88 Id. at 3490 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
89 Id. at 3492. One of the underlying themes of Justice Stevens' dissent is his concern
about how the Supreme Court, representing one sovereign, deals with state courts, represent-
ing other sovereigns. Few would quarrel with Justice Stevens' call for restraint in Finnish
affairs, but under the Constitution the state courts are "sovereign" only insofar as they apply
their own law. When they interpret federal law, the Constitutional and statutory framework
permits Supreme Court review.
Abandoning such review powers and abandoning uniformity in federal law, as Justice
Stevens suggests, would render the Supreme Court an ineffective constitutional organ. See
notes 119-30 injra and accompanying text.
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B. Measuring the Michigan v. Long Rule Against Principles of
Federalism
The Court's decision in Michigan v. Long to adjust its internal
controls over assessing whether nonfederal grounds support a state
court's judgment will undoubtedly stir debate and raise concerns
over the potential intrusiveness of the new rule. Whether future dis-
positions of state cases will tell us much about how the rule is actu-
ally working inside the Court remains to be seen.90 There is
nonetheless the very real and present problem of how the new rule
will be perceived, measured, and applied by counsel and the state
courts. This section briefly analyzes the rule against the standards
that the Court itself has relied upon in the past for declining to re-
view certain state court decisions: the respect for state courts and a
desire to avoid advisory opinions.91
1. Respect for State Courts
One of the principle reasons for the Court's independent and
adequate state ground rule is its respect for state courts. The Court,
especially the Burger Court, is sensitive to the respective roles of the
federal and state judicial systems and does not wish to intrude into
the affairs of state courts.9 2 However, the manner in which the Court
shows that respect, and what the Court considers to be intrusive, re-
main volatile questions.
One's definition of "respect" and "intrusiveness" in any particu-
lar case generally reflects one's personal opinion of whether the Court
has rendered an acceptable decision. For instance, some would con-
sider the Supreme Court to be disrespectful and unduly intrusive in
state court affairs if it drastically broadened its reading of federal
individual rights and reversed state court decisions which favored a
narrower view.9 3 In defining "respect" and "intrusiveness," the
Court must, therefore, find a middle ground. The question that has
arisen now is whether A*ichz'gan v. Long's "assumption" rule best ar-
90 The caveat footnote in Justice O'Connor's majority opinion, see note 64 supra, creates
the real possibility that, in an ambiguous state decision, the Court will have examined state
law rather than relying on the new assumption. In that instance a specific statement from the
Court that it did so would be desirable.
91 See notes 23-26 supra and accompanying text.
92 See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971). See generaly L. TRIBE, supra note
10, at 152-56.
93 That was certainly the view following the Warren Court's "incorporation" cases. See
Friendly, The Bill of Rightr as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 929 (1965);
Sheran, supra note 16, at 791.
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ticulates that ground. One of the dangers in answering this question
is to assume that because the Burger Court adopted the "assump-
tion" rule, it is simply another veiled device to whittle away at indi-
vidual rights. If one accepts that premise, then all the present
Court's salutary language concerning respect for state courts is
hollow.
The better and more objective approach is to recognize that
Michigan v. Long is important for separate and distinct reasons: first,
because of what it says about the relationship between the Supreme
Court and the state courts, and second, from a criminal procedure
perspective because of its expansion of Terry v. Ohio.94 While each of
these facets of the case effects the other, the two elements should not
be mixed. The paradox is that while state courts and commentators
may well shudder that the Court has narrowed fourth amendment
protections, the Court has again implicitly reminded the state courts
that they are free to adopt more protective standards; by clearly rely-
ing on independent and adequate state grounds, they may virtually
immunize their decisions from Supreme Court review. The Court
has clearly articulated that, when applying state law, state courts are
the final arbiters of cases, as long as they do not apply that state law
in such a way as to infringe upon federal constitutional rights.95 Yet
the Court's "respect" for state autonomy is not absolute. Some "in-
trusion" into that autonomy is permitted when federal law is at
stake.96 In assessing Michigan v. Long, therefore, it is helpful to bal-
ance the degree of intrusion into state autonomy, the desire for uni-
formity in application of federal law, and the need to decide as a
jurisdictional matter between those competing interests.
a. Scope of the Rule.- Minimal Intrusion
The classic example of a nonreviewable state court decision
arises when the state court relied exclusively upon specific state con-
stitutional provisions to strike down a state statute.97 The new rule
should not change that result. Nor should the rule apply where the
94 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
95 See, e.g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 61 (1968) (state may not authorize police
conduct which "trenches upon Fourth Amendment rights, regardless of the labels which it
attaches to such conduct").
96 Professor Tribe points out that when deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction over
state decisions, the Court decides "whether state autonomy threatens federal interests to such
an extent that uniformity must prevail." L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 122. This analysis,
according to Tribe, occurs when both federal and state interests are implicated, i.e. when the
state law is a "hybrid". Id
97 People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 380, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. denied, 406
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state court relies exclusively on federal grounds without referring at
all to state law.98 In each of these examples the Court is presented
with a bright line; there is therefore no need to struggle with deduc-
tive devices.
The more difficult case arises when the state court decision
could be fairly interpreted to rest on both federal and state grounds.
In the past, the Court in those cases resorted to one of the previously
discussed options for determining jurisdiction.99 Now the rule in
Michzgan v. Long will apply in those types of cases. 10 0 However, the
rule is in fact narrower than it first appears: it is restricted to those
cases where there is clearly some room for disagreement on whether
independent and adequate state grounds are present. Even then the
Court may call for clarification from the state court. 10 1
Given the relatively limited scope of the rule, and measured
against the possible options of either interpreting state law or asking
the state court to clarify its opinion, the degree of intrusion into the
affairs of a state court should be de minimis~.0 2 Indeed, a good argu-
ment can be made that the rule is not at all intrusive. It certainly
cannot be any more offensive than having the Supreme Court ulti-
mately disagree with a state court and reverse its decision. In Michi-
gan v. Long, the Court has asked nothing more than that the state
court, in the first instance, be as clear as reasonably possible in stat-
ing the grounds for its decision.
Assuming that the state court declines, for whatever reason,10 3 to
draw clear lines between federal and nonfederal grounds in its deci-
sion, the Court will assume that the state court felt bound by federal
law and thus rested its judgment primarily on federal grounds. 10 4
This approach is a reasonable and practical compromise. Granted,
use of this reasoning might be intrusive in the sense that it may be an
U.S. 958 (1972)(declaring capital punishment in California unconstitutional under the state
constitution).
98 See, e.g., Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 390 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1968).
99 See notes 40-48 supra and accompanying text.
100 The Michigan v. Long rule is specifically designed for use in those "state court decision[s
which] fairly appearf] to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal
law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear
from the face of the opinion." 103 S. Ct. at 3476.
101 Id. at 3476 n.6.
102 See Wechsler, The AppellateJurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Reiections on The Law and The
Logistics of Direct Review, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1043, 1056 (1977) (the major virtue of
direct review is its "marginal intrusion" upon state authority).
103 The reasons will obviously vary. The state court, for example, may be walking a local
political tightrope or it may even think that it has clearly stated the grounds for its decision.
104 103 S. Ct. at 3478.
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incorrect assumption and therefore cause an incorrect interpretation
of the state court's reasoning. But to assume instead that the state
court relied on state grounds may be equally incorrect and, although
more deferential to the state court's autonomy, that reasoning could
result in unnecessarily insulating a state court's opinion. 10 5 In sum-
mary, even assuming that there is some intrusion on the state court's
autonomy, it is a minimal and necessary incident of doing business in
a federalist judicial system.
b. Presumption, Assumptions, and Stretching Jurisdiction
In measuring the new rule, it is also important to note that Mich-
igan v. Long does not expand the Court's jurisdiction over state court
judgments. At most, the Court now merely assumes that one juris-
dictional prerequisite-nonfederal grounds-no longer faces peti-
tioners in a narrow class of cases. 106
The Court's self-imposed, nonfederal-ground rule is not the
Court's only jurisdictional hurdle. Should counsel successfully leap
this first hurdle, there are other equally imposing ones to surmount.
For example, counsel must demonstrate that the decision below con-
tains a substantial federal question, 10 7 that it is final, 0 8 and that it is
of the highest state court. 109 There are then other justiciability hur-
dles such as standing,10 ripeness, and mootness."' Even then the
Court may impose other less remarkable, self-imposed hurdles; for
example, is there a conflict between the state's decision and other
federal or state decisions?" 12
The point is to emphasize that Michigan v. Long does not presume
jurisdiction." 3 Nor should it be viewed as an attempt to stretch juris-
diction. The Court would hardly have needed a new rule to do that.
It could have simply concluded, sub silentio, that a state court's deci-
sion had not rested on nonfederal grounds.
105 Id. at 3476; see also Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940).
106 See notes 97-101 supra and accompanying text.
107 See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976); R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 9, at 208-30.
108 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976).
109 Id.
110 See generaly L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 79-89.
111 Id at 62-68.
112 For a thorough discussion of this question and of other factors in deciding whether to
grant plenary review, see R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 9, at 254-336.
113 The text of the majority opinion in Michigan v. Long used the term "assumption." 103
S. Ct. at 3476. In a footnote, however, the Court recognized that it uses certain "presump-
tions" in deciding jurisdictional issues. Id. at 3477 n.8. It is Justice Stevens' dissent which
includes repeated references to the new "presumption". See id. at 3489 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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In his dissent, Justice Stevens expresses concern for the Court's
increasing tendency to accept requests from state prosecutors to re-
view unfavorable state court decisions.114 Does the rule in Michigan v.
Long in fact signal an open-door policy to state prosecutors? Not
necessarily. The Court was hearing prosecutor appeals long before it
decided Michigan v. Long. Even assuming the Court is more inclined
to hear prosecutor appeals, it did not need the new rule to support its
decision to do so." 5
Although the rule tends to favor petitioners and appellants, in
theory the rule does not discriminate between prosecutors and de-
fendants. When either party appeals an adverse state court decision,
it must leap the nonfederal ground hurdle. The rule appears unfairly
one-sided now because a more conservative Court is facing several
activist state courts which have tended to interpret federal constitu-
tional rights more broadly than a majority of the Supreme Court.
Ironically, however, the rule may ultimately reduce successful state
prosecutor appeals. By simply resting their expansive rulings for in-
dividual rights on state grounds, state courts can use the nonfederal-
ground rule to reduce state prosecutor appeals." 6 Finally, it seems
unlikely that the Court will disregard its heavy docket problems" 1 7 to
fling its doors open to state prosecutors."t 8
c. The Need for Uniformity in Application of State Law
The majority opinion in Michigan v. Long only briefly mentioned
the need for uniformity in federal law as justification for reviewing
114 Id. at 3491 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115 A review of U.S. Law Week for the 1983 Term through Jan. 1984 indicates that the
states filed 25 cases, 19 of which were criminal. Review was granted in 3 criminal cases, Ohio
v. Johnson, 104 S. Ct. 994 (1984)(double jeopardy); Arizona v. Rumsey, 104 S. Ct. 697
(1984)(capital sentencing); California v. Trombetta, 104 S. Ct. 696 (1984)(DWI
breathalyzers), and 1 civil case, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 104 S. Ct. 480 (1984)(use of drug
detection dogs in schools).
During the same time period, state defendants filed 74 direct appeals. As of Jan. 31,
1984, the Court had granted review in 3 cases: Spaziano v. Flordia, 104 S. Ct. 697
(1984)(death penalty); Waller v. Georgia, 104 S. Ct. 390 (1983)(search and seizure); Cole v.
Georgia, 104 S. Ct. 390 (1983) (Waller and Cole were consolidated by the Court).
116 See notes 210-14 infra and accompanying text.
117 The Michigan v. Long rule is grounded as much on practical considerations as any
concern for maintaining federalism. The task of deciding which 200 of the approximately
4,000 cases filed annually will be granted plenary review is obviously time consuming. The
problem is compounded when a state court decision, which may be a good vehicle for resolv-
ing a major constitutional issue, is ambiguous as to whether the state grounds are independ-
ent and adequate.
118 See note 115 supra; cf. Welsh, Whose Federalism? The Burger Court's Treatment of State Civil
Liberties Judgments, 10 HAST. CONsT. L.Q. 819 (1984).
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state court decisions.' 1 9 However, absent a need for uniformity, the
underpinnings for the rule in AIic zgan v. Long fall. As the Court
noted in Herb v. Pitcairn,120 "[O]ur only power over state judgments is
to correct them to the extent that they incorrectly adjudge federal
rights."' 12 1 That proposition, supported by the supremacy clause, 122
is not only beyond debate, but is also a common-sense rule. To per-
mit each state to interpret federal law in its own terms and to the
extent it deems worthwhile would simply open the doors to judicial
balkanization; respecting a state's autonomy is a worthwhile goal,
but usurping the Supreme Court's prerogative to serve as the final
arbiter of federal constitutional law is an unacceptable cost. 123
Critics of the nonfederal-ground rule may argue that relying on
the uniformity argument to rule in favor of state prosecutors does not
advance the cause of federalism. But it does. The supremacy clause
checks threats to federal interests, not just threats to a defendant's
federal rights. If in ruling against a state prosecutor the state court
has relied on federal grounds, it should not be able to insulate its
erroneous reading of the Constitution by simply saying that its action
benefitted the state defendant.124
119 103 S. Ct. at 3475. In sharp contrast, Justice Stevens' dissent minimized the need for
such uniformity and further advocated jurisdictional abstention unless the state court has
denied a federal right. Id at 3491.
120 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
121 Id. at 125-26.
122 U.S. CONsT. art. VI.
123 See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), where in addressing the
motives for exercising appellate review over state court decisions, the Court stated:
That motive is the importance, and even necessity ofunifnni of decisions through-
out the whole United States, upon all subjects within the purview of the constitu-
tion. Judges of equal learning and integrity, in different states, might differently
interpret a statute, or a treaty of the United States, or even the constitution itself. if
there were no revising authority to control these jarring and discordant judgments,
and harmonize them into uniformity, the laws, the treaties and the constitution of
the United States would be different in different states, and might, perhaps, never
have precisely the same construction, obligation, or efficacy, in any two states. The
public mischiefs that would attend such a state of things would be truly deplorable;
and it cannot be believed that they could have escaped the enlightened convention
which formed the constitution. What, indeed, might then have been only prophecy,
has now become fact; and the appellate jurisdiction must continue to be the only
adequate remedy for such evils. [original emphasis].
Id at 347-48.
124 Article III of the Constitution does not limit Supreme Court review to those cases
where a constitutional right has been denied, nor does 28 U.S.C. §1257 draw such lines, see
note 7 supra. There may be practical concerns for narrowing Supreme Court jurisdiction, as
Justice Stevens suggests in his dissent, 103 S. Ct. at 3491, but the present constitutional and
statutory framework for appellate review by the Court does not support the narrow view he
suggests.
[Vol. 59:1079]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Most state courts agree that uniformity in federal law is desira-
ble and worthy of protection. 25 In the area of federal criminal law
the argument for uniformity is particularly compelling because of the
national nature of law enforcement and prosecution; even then there
is often disparity between the federal circuits. 126
This is not to say that state courts are bound to remain in lock-
step with the Supreme Court in applying more protective state law.
Although perhaps desirable, there is no constitutional requirement
that state and federal law be uniform. What is required is that the
state courts maintain the uniform minimum federal protections
drawn by the Supreme Court. If they should choose to expand fed-
eral protections and thus waver from the uniform federal standard,
they risk plenary review and reversal.' 2 7 Although the state courts
are often encouraged to experiment, 28 they must also realize that
experiments are sometimes unsuccessful. For many activist state
courts that is an acceptable risk; it is always possible that a majority
of the Court will agree with them and expand certain federal rights.
But federalism does not guarantee that the Supreme Court will defer
125 A resolution unanimously passed by the Conference of Chief Justices in 1982 ad-
dressed the issue of whether state courts should be the final arbiters of controversial issues
such as abortion, school busing, and prayer in schools. In this resolution the Conference
noted that depriving the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to finally review those questions
would be undesirable. One of the Chief Justice's underlying concerns in passing this resolu-
tion was that, without Supreme Court review, federal constitutional rights would not be uni-
formly applied. The resolution stated in part:
C. State court litigation constantly presents new situations testing the boundaries
of federal constitutional rights. Without the unifying function of United States
Supreme Court review, there inevitably will be divergence in state court decisions,
and thus the United Stated Constitution could mean something different in each of
the fifty states;
D. Confusion will exist as to whether and how federal acts will be enforced in state
courts and, if enforced, how states may properly act against federal officers ....
Resolution I-Resolution Relating to Proposed Legislation to Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts
(Jan. 30, 1982 meeting of the Conference of Chief Justices, Williamsburg, Virginia), reprinted
in 128 CONG. REC. S2242 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1982). In Gressman & Gressman, Necessary and
Proper Roots of Exceptions to Federaljurisdiction, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 495 (1983) the authors
conclude that the resolution indicates that "state courts want no part in any such experiment
in neo-federalism." Id. at 507.
126 Conflicting decisions between the circuit courts of appeals is one of several factors the
Court considers in deciding whether to grant plenary review. See Sup. CT. R. 17.1.
127 Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975).
128 The states are often referred to as independent laboratories or experimenters. See Mc-
Cray v. New York, 103 S. Ct. 2438, 2439 (1983) (Stevens, J., opinion respecting the denial of
cert.)(permit states to experiment with peremptory challenges); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406
U.S. 356, 376 (1972) (criminal procedure); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)(novel social and economic experiments); see also Note, Of Labo-
ratories and Liberties: State Court Protection of Political and Civil Rights, 10 GA. L. REV. 533 (1976).
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to state courts. Nor does it bar the Court from narrowing or redefin-
ing the "federal line" when a state decision presents it with the op-
portunity to do so. As Justice O'Conner pointed out in Michgan v.
Long, the vast majority of criminal cases (and therefore the most fer-
tile ground for development of federal criminal law) comes from the
state courts.129 Naturally, then, the chance of a federal constitutional
issue being decided through a state court decision is high. 130
2. The Danger of Advisory Opinions
Another justification for the Court's nonfederal-ground rule is
that it will decrease the possibility of rendering advisory opinions.
However, application of the nonfederal-ground rule may sometimes
cause the Court to violate its rule against rendering advisory opin-
ion. 13 1 In a jurisdictional sense, an ambiguous state court judgment
may not present an adequate "case or controversy" for review under
article 111.132 Also, assuming the Court reversed an "ambiguous"
state case on federal grounds, the state court on remand may ignore
the Supreme Court's opinion by explaining that its earlier ambigu-
ous judgment actually rested on nonreviewable state grounds. 133
The "advisory opinion" problem then is as much a practical problem
as a theoretical one.
In Michigan v. Long, the Court recognized that the state courts
can in the first instance help the Supreme Court avoid rendering
non-binding advisory opinions by being as clear as possible in stating
the basis for their judgments. Where the grounds for a state judg-
ment are clear, the danger of giving an advisory opinion is virtually
absent. 134 But, where the state judgment is ambiguous, the Court
must take some calculated risks; in doing so it could possibly render
an advisory opinion.
Instead of adopting the nonfederal-ground rule, the Court in
129 103 S. Ct. at 3477, n.8.
130 Cf. Brennan, State Court Decisions and the Supreme Court, 31 PA. B.A.Q. 393, 398
(1960)("[a] federal question emerges from the grist of state courts with greatest rarity.").
131 The Court's rule of not rendering advisory opinions is primarily self-imposed. Michi-
gan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3476, 3477 (1983); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125 (1945).
132 Cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 430 n.40 (1963) (whether the nonfederal-ground rule is
constitutionally required is not crucial because the statutory provision, § 1257, limits review
tojudgments or decrees of state court).
133 See, e.g., State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316 (Or. 1983), discussed in notes 175-79 nfra
and accompanying text.
134 If the state judgment clearly rests on federal grounds, the Court may grant review and
address the federal law; presumably the lower court will find it more difficult to later back-
peddle into state grounds. Where the state judgment clearly rests on state grounds, the Court
will decline review.
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Long could have assumed that the ambiguous decision rests on in-
dependent and adequate state grounds and decline review. 135 That
would clearly be more deferential to the state courts but would also
needlessly insulate expansive state decisions from assessment under
federal constitutional standards.1 36
To assume, as the Court now says it will, that in certain situa-
tions the state court felt compelled to rely on federal law does create
some risk of rendering an advisory opinion. On balance, the risk is
acceptable. The state court may indeed later explain away its sup-
posed reliance on federal law. 137 But that possibility seems slight
135 Indeed, this was Justice Steven's position. 103 S. Ct. at 3489 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136 See Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551 (1940), where the Court said:
It is important that this Court not indulge in needless dissertations on constitu-
tional law. It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in
interpreting their state constitutions. But it is equally important that ambiguous or
obscure adjudications by state courts do not stand as barriers to a determination by
this Court of the validity under the federal constitution of state action. Intelligent
exercise of our appellate powers compels us to ask for the elimination of the obscuri-
ties and ambiguities from the opinions in such cases. Only then can we ascertain
whether or not our jurisdiction to review should be invoked. Only by that proce-
dure can the responsibility for striking down or upholding state legislation be fairly
placed. For no other course assures that important federal issues, such as have been
argued here, will reach this Court for adjudication; that state courts will not be the
final arbiters of important issues under the federal constitution; and that we will not
encroach on the constitutional jurisdiction of the states. This is not a mere technical
rule nor a rule for our convenience. It touches the division of authority between
state courts and this Court and is of equal importance to each. Only by such explic-
itness can the highest courts of the states and this court keep within the bounds of
their respective jurisdictions.
Id at 557.
137 For example, In State v. Chrisman, 676 P.2d 449 (Wash. 1984), the Washington
Supreme Court did an about face on its first decision in which it relied on federal grounds to
reject the prosecution's "plain view" argument. On plenary review, the Supreme Court in
Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982), reversed and remanded, noting that the Wash-
ington Supreme Court's novel reading of the fourth amendment was incorrect. Id. at 16. On
remand the Washington Supreme Court adhered to its earlier decision but this time it based
its reasoning "solely and exclusively on the [state] constitution." 676 P.2d at 421. The court
acknowledged the Supreme Court's authority to act as final arbiter of federal constitutional
law, but it also recognized that a "plain statement of independent state grounds precludes
federal court review." Id. Turning to article 1, § 7 of the state constitution and other state
cases, the Washington court stood by its original decision; in that decision, however, the
Washington court had primarily relied on federal law. In reviewing Chrisman the Supreme
Court had noted that the Washington court had primarily relied on federal law and therefore
rejected the argument that there were independent and adequate state grounds precluding
review. 455 U.S. at 5 n.2. Judge Dimmick dissented from the Washington court's second
opinion in Chrisman. He argued that clear rules are not assured when "we waffle between
state and federal constitutions." 676 P.2d at 425 (Dimmick J., dissenting). This case thus
demonstrates the manner in which a state court may reach the same conclusion by relying
solely on state law and thus have the last say on the matter. See also State v. Kennedy, 666
P.2d 1316 (Or. 1983); notes 175-79 infra and accompanying text.
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when the state judgment appears to rest primarily on federal law and
any possible state ground is not clearly stated on the face of the opin-
ion. 3  That is the sort of case to which Michigan v. Long applies.
It is important to note again that the Court implicitly recognizes
that there are endless combinations of federal-state grounds, 39 and
that ambiguous state decisions will no doubt continue. Each state
case presented to the Court for plenary review offers a new opportu-
nity to balance federal and state interests and offers new risks of ren-
dering advisory opinions. The Court is always free to opt out of
plenary review if it finds the risks unacceptable.
Even where the Court opts out of plenary review, one or more
Justices could possibly gratuitously comment on the merits of the
case in a concurring or dissenting opinion. That was the situation in
Colorado v. Nunez. 140 The Colorado Supreme Court held that the
prosecution could be required to disclose to the defense an inform-
ant's identity for assessing the validity of a search warrant.' 4' The
Supreme Court granted certiorari, t42 but after hearing oral argument
it dismissed the case as improvidently granted; the state decision
rested on independent and adequate state grounds. 43 Concurring in
the per curiam dismissal, Justice White, joined by the Chief Justice
and Justice O'Connor, emphasized that "neither the Federal Consti-
tution nor any decision of [the] Court requires the result reached by
the Colorado Supreme Court.' 44 Justice Stevens also concurred but
138 See note 133 supra.
139 Michigan v. Long does not explicitly address what sort of "model" the state courts may
or will use when they decide cases. Cf. Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Relationship Between
State and Federal Courts.- A Critique of Mfichigan v. Long, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1118 (1984) in
which the author suggests that the O'Connor-Stevens debate represents a debate over the
"interstitial" model and the "classical" model-both terms being used to describe how states
may interpret their constitutions. The models are analyzed in Developments in the Law--The
Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1356 (1982). See also P.
BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FED-
ERAL SYsTEM 470 (2d ed. 1972).
140 104 S. Ct. 1257 (1984).
141 People v. Nunez, 658 P.2d 879 (Colo. 1983). The Colorado Supreme Court's opinion
cites only several state decisions, no federal authority; on its face then the state decision rested
on state grounds.
142 104 S. Ct. 65 (1983). Certiorari was granted on Oct. 3, 1983, well after the Court's
decision in Michigan v. Long (July 6, 1983). Assuming that the case somehow slipped through
a jurisdictional crack, the respondent apparently later apprised the Court that "jurisdic-
tional" problems existed. His motion to dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction was denied,
however, in Nov. 1983. 104 S. Ct. 478 (1983). Remarkably, Justice Stevens, who usually
criticizes the Court for granting review in cases of this type, said nothing about the Court's
initial decision to hear it and its later denial of the motion to dismiss.
143 104 S. Ct. 1257 (1984).
144 Id. at 1257.
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expressed concern over Justice White's "advisory opinion," noting
that Justice White's remark was entirely gratuitous and evidenced
the Court's emerging tendency to enlarge its involvement in state
litigation. 145
From a purely time-management viewpoint, Justice Stevens is
correct. The Court must be stingy with its resources. What is more
puzzling, however, is why Justice White felt it important to give what
in effect is an advisory opinion. Was it to light the way for other
state and federal courts who might misread the Colorado decision as
a "blessed" expansion of federal law? Or was it, as Justice Stevens
says, an attempt to enlarge the Court's "involvement" in state court
litigation? The first explanation seems more plausible. Justice
White's "advisory opinion" does not tell the Colorado court how to
decide future cases on this same issue. It does, however, telegraph to
all courts how three of the nine Justices might rule on a similar case
grounded on federal, rather than state, law.
The Court recently addressed the issue of advisory opinions in
Florida v. Meers .146 In that case the intermediate Florida appellate
court reversed a criminal conviction on grounds that the trial court
had erred in admitting contraband seized in violation of the fourth
amendment.t47 The state court also noted that because the case was
being remanded for a new trial, it would briefly mention another
appellate point-the fact that under state law the respondent was
unduly restricted in cross-examining a witness. 148 In a lengthy foot-
note the Court first rejected the argument that the state court deci-
sion rested on an independent and adequate state ground; citing
Michzgan v. Long, the Court noted that the state court's reference to
the state law issue was "hardly a clear indication" that the court's
decision to reverse rested on an independent and adequate state
ground. 149 The Court continued, however, by noting that even if the
state ground was independent, it had the power to review the fourth
145 Justice Stevens also remarked that:
This tendency feeds on itself, for it can only encourage litigants-particularly insti-
tutional litigants-to file even more petitions for certiorari in the hope of obtaining,
if not review and reversal, at least an opinion by a number of Supreme Court Jus-
tices in support of their position. In light of the increasing flood of certiorari peti-
tions, today's advisory opinion provides further support for concluding that this
situation "will very likely progressively worsen."
Id. at 1259-60 (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
146 104 S. Ct. 1852 (1984) (per curiam).
147 Meyers v. State, 432 So. 2d 97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
148 Id at 99.
149 104 S. Ct. at 1852 n.*.
[1984]
JUDICIAL FEDERALISM
amendment issue. 150 Citing Herb v. Picairn,151 the Court stated that
in this case there was no possibility that its opinion would be merely
advisory. 15 2 Regardless of how the state appellate court rules, said
the Court, the disposition of the constitutional issue is critical to the
new trial. Thus, there was no jurisdictional reason to decline
review. 153
The danger of rendering advisory opinions exists in any case,
whether the Court has granted plenary review or not. But the types
of danger are different. In a case where the Court assumes the ab-
sence of state grounds and then decides a question of federal law, the
danger is that, on remand, the state court will sidestep the Court's
decision and render it meaningless. 15 4 When, as in Nunez, the Court
decides not to reach the merits but a Justice nonetheless offers an
advisory opinion on the merits, the "danger" lies in lower courts' reli-
ance on that opinion 5
Although the new rule in Michigan v. Long presents some risk of
rendering advisory opinions, that danger always exists; it is, there-
fore, to be distinguished from the danger involved in including indi-
vidual, gratuitous opinions in denials of plenary review.
III. Response From the State Courts in Criminal Law Decisions
A. Recent Returns
The Supreme Court has clearly given a judicial cue to state
courts-they have a great deal to say about which cases clear the
nonfederal-ground jurisdictional hurdle. 156 Likewise, the Court has
150 Id
151 324 U.S. 117, 126 (1945); see notes 23 and 24 supra accompanying text.
152 104 S. Ct. at 1853 n.*.
153 In reaching this conclusion the Court correctly assumed that the two grounds, the
fourth amendment ground and the state law cross-examination ground, were independent of
each other. But the Court may have incorrectly assumed that its resolution of the fourth
amendment issue was critical to a new trial. Arguably, the Florida state court on remand
could ignore the Supreme Court's fourth amendment analysis and instead rest its reversal on
more protective state search and seizure law. Would that not render the Supreme Court's
decision advisory?
154 See notes 133-37 supra and accompanying text.
155 For example, until the Court fully addresses the issue raised in Nunez, lower courts may
rely on Justice White's concurring opinion as though he spoke for a majority. Rather than
being ignored, it is likely to be cited as authority.
156 Cf. Welsh, supra note 139, at 1118 (status of state judgment is entirely in the hands of
the Justices). Whether the state electorate will graciously receive such expansive rulings is
another matter, however. See, e.g., Crawford v. Los Angeles Bd. of Educ., 102 S. Ct. 3211
(1982) (California voters amended the state's constitution to bring state courts in line with
narrower federal court interpretations of the equal protection clause on school busing).
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reminded the state courts that while they may provide expansive
state-ground rulings, attempts to unduly expand federal law may be
curtailed.
This course is understandably frustrating for those who would
prefer to see state courts free themselves from what is now a more
conservative Court. 157 On the other hand, those of a more conserva-
tive persuasion are concerned that activist state courts may further
protect state criminal defendants by relying on state grounds for
their rulings. 158 Unfortunately, the critical gaze is sometimes turned
from the state courts to the Supreme Court, especially by those who
are frustrated by state courts that are content to follow federal law
rather than forge or revive reliance on state law. This criticism gen-
erally takes the form of challenging the present Court's right to stifle
any state court initiative. 59 While a slim majority of the present
Court disfavors increasing federal constitutional safeguards for crimi-
nal defendants, one cannot ignore the repeated reminders by both
conservative and liberal members of the Court that state courts are
free to adopt increased safeguards based upon independent state
law. 160 Whether the state courts or legislatures accept that challenge
depends upon them.
Since Michigan v. Long was decided, several state courts have re-
sponded to the call for more protective criminal law rulings based on
state law. Others have declared that federal protections are broad
enough. Although the number of cases noted here are few, they indi-
cate the broader response that is yet to come as state appellate courts
continue to struggle with decisions in criminal procedure.161
A number of state courts have recently opted to provide more
157 See, e.g., Welsh, supra note 118.
158 See Florida v. Casal, 103 S. Ct. 3100 (1983) (per curiam) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
159 State v. Jackson, 672 P.2d 255, 261-65 (Mont. 1983) (Shea, J., dissenting); see also
Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REv.
1212 (1978)(author suggests the Supreme Court should not review expansive state court
decisions).
160 Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3476 (1983) (O'Connor, J.); Florida v. Casal, 103
S. Ct. 3100 (1983) (per curiam) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96,
120 (1975) (Brennan, J., concurring); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 726 (1975) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
161 Scores of state court decisions reflect an independent and more protective state path in
all areas of the law. The focus here is narrower, however. It is those state criminal law
decisions following Michigan v. Long that might show how that decision will be received. For
recent commentaries addressing expansive rulings see, Welsh, supra note 149; Galie, State Con-
stitutional Guarantees and the Alaska Supreme Court: Criminal Procedure Rights and the New Federalism,
1960-1981, 18 GONZ. L. REV. 221 (1983); Comment, State Constitutional Rights of Free Speech on
Private Property: The Liberal Loophole, 18 GONZ. L. REV. 81 (1983); see also note I supra.
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protective search and seizure rulings through their state law. In State
v. Ball,162 the New Hampshire Supreme Court relied upon its state's
constitution to interpret the plain view exception more narrowly
than the Supreme Court did in Texas v. Brown.163 According to the
state court, the Supreme'Court would permit a warrantless seizure of
a "suspicious"'1 64 item. 165 The state court relied on the state constitu-
tion's ban on unreasonable searches and seizures, on case law, 66 and
on the Supreme Court's plurality opinion in Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire167 in holding that only probable cause would support the
seizure of an item in plain view. The court did not reach the federal
issue. 168
162 471 A.2d 347 (N.H. 1983).
163 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983).
164 The state court may have overstated the Supreme Court's decision in Brown. In restat-
ing the federal plain view rule, the Supreme Court did state that officers may seize "suspi-
cious" objects. Brown, 103 S. Ct. at 1541. But the test applied by the Brown plurality was
probable cause to believe that the items seized from the defendant were associated with crimi-
nal activity. Id. at 1542.
165 In laying the framework for its departure from Brown, the court stated:
While the role of the Federal Constitution is to provide the minimum level of national
protection of fundamental rights, our court has stated that it has the power to inter-
pret the New Hampshire Constitution as more protective of individual rights than
the parallel provisions of the United States Constitution. . . . The Supreme Court
has recognized this authority and has stated that its holdings "[do] not affect the
State's power to impose higher standards on searches and seizures than required by
the Federal Constitution if it chooses to do so." Cooper v. California ...
Even if it appears that the Federal Constitution is more protective than the
State Constitution, the right of our citizens to the full protection of the New Hamp-
shire Constitution requires that we consider State constitutional guarantees. This is
because any decision we reach based uponfederal law is subject to review by the
United States Supreme Court, whereas we have unreviewable authority to reach a
decision based on articulated adequate and independent State grounds. Michzgan v.
Long, . . . Therefore, we will first examine the New Hampshire Constitution and
only then, if we find no protected rights thereunder, will we examine the Federal
Constitution to determine whether it provides greater protection.
471 A.2d at 350-51 (citations omitted).
166 State v. Beede, 119 N.H. 620, 626, 406 A.2d 125, 130 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 967
(1980); State v. Theodosopoulos, 119 N.H. 573, 578, 409 A.2d 1134, 1137 (1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 983 (1980).
167 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
168 The idea of focusing first on the state issue, which may dispose of the question, is a
sound and oft-recommended practice. P. Galie & L. Galie, State Constitutional Guarantees and
Supreme Court Review.- justice Marshalls Proposal in Oregon v. Hass, 82 DICK. L. REv. 273
(1978)(authors urge Supreme Court to adopt rule requiring state courts to decide state issue
first); Linde, Without "Due ProcessL--Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REv. 125 (1970);
Carson, "Last Things Last"- A Methodological Approach to Legal Arguments in State Courts, 19 WIL-
LAMETrE L. J. 641 (1983). ChiefJustice Burger urged using this procedure in the Year-End
Report of the judiciary, 18 (1981). Noting that maintaining the federalism balance is a two-
way street, Justice Stevens criticized the state court in Massachusetts v. Upton, 104 S. Ct.
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The Washington Supreme Court also rendered an expansive
ruling in Ringer v. Slate169 where it considered two consolidated cases
involving warrantless searches of automobiles. 170 The court noted
that under federal law each search could be valid; one under United
Sates v. Ross,171 which permits probable cause warrantless searches of
vehicles; the other under New York v. Belton,172 which permits war-
rantless searches incident to arrest. However, rather than evaluating
the searches on federal law standards, the court moved to an analysis
of the state constitution and state case law. 173 The court rejected Ross
and concluded that state law only permitted warrantless vehicle
searches where exigent circumstances are present.174
In several other cases, the state courts have had an opportunity
to reexamine their earlier decisions following a remand by the
Supreme Court. In each case the question whether there was an in-
dependent and adequate state ground was raised at the Supreme
Court level.
The Oregon Supreme Court's opinion on remand in State v. Ken-
nedy 75 provides a good discussion of the independent path which the
state courts may choose to follow.' 76 The court's decision, which was
handed down the same date as Michigan v. Long, rested primarily on
2085, 2090 (1984), for not addressing first the question of whether the state constitution was
applicable. It is important, he said, that state courts not "unnecessarily invite" Supreme
Court review of state court decisions. Id.
169 674 P.2d 1240 (Wash. 1983).
170 In each case the defendant was properly arrested, handcuffed, and placed in a patrol
car. Officers then searched the vehicle and in each case found contraband. In both cases
officers had learned from others that probable cause existed to arrest the defendants; an out-
standing warrant existed for defendant Ringer, and defendant Corcovan was linked to boat
theft.
171 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
172 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
173 As for the search incident to an arrest, the Court first traced the development of the
federal search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement. The Washington
Court noted that, until the Supreme Court decided .Vewo York v. Belton in 1981, it (the Wash-
ington Court) had neglected its own state constitution, focusing instead on the federal consti-
tution. In Ringer the Washington court returned to the protections of its own state
constitution and overruled any other state cases that were inconsistent with its decision in
Ringer. 674 P.2d at 1247.
For another example of reliance on state law and rejection of the Be/ton rule, see People
v. Gokey, 60 N.Y.2d 309, 457 N.E.2d 723, 469 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1983).
174 The court in Ringer concluded that no exigent circumstances were present. 674 P.2d at
1249.
175 666 P.2d 1316 (Or. 1983).
176 When this case was before the Supreme Court on plenary review, the Court expressed
concern that independent and adequate state grounds might have supported the state court's
opinion. 456 U.S. at 671 (opinion of the court) and 681 (Stevens, J., concurring, joined by
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.). Nonetheless, it addressed the double jeopardy issues,
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Oregon law and interpreted the state's double-jeopardy protections
more broadly than the fifth amendment provision as applied by the
Supreme Court in its review of the case. 177 In resting its decision on
state law, the Oregon Supreme Court noted that, while the Oregon
courts often refer to federal decisions in deciding issues which have
been previously undecided under state law, the Oregon Supreme
Court cites federal opinions only because it finds them persuasive
and not because it considers itself bound to do so under federal
doctrines.' 78
By relying on state grounds, the Oregon Supreme Court argua-
bly rendered the Supreme Court's decision "advisory," although
there can be no doubt that what the court said about fifth amend-
ment double jeopardy issues will aid lower federal and state courts
looking for guidance on federal law on the issue. 17
9
Another case in which the Supreme Court recognized the possi-
bility that an independent and adequate state ground existed for a
state court's decision is State v. Jackson. 180 The issue raised in that case
was the extent of fifth amendment protection for motorists who re-
fused to submit to breathalizer sobriety tests.181 When the Supreme
Court resolved the same issue in South Dakota v. Neville,'12 it vacated
and remanded Jackson to the Montana Supreme Court for consider-
ation of whether the Montana court's earlier decision 8 3 (ruling
against admission of evidence that the motorist refused the test)
rested on federal or state grounds, or both, and, if it was based on
federal grounds, to reconsider the case in light of Neville.18 4
reversed, and remanded the case to the Oregon courts for further proceedings. 456 U.S. at
679.
177 Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982). The federal double jeopardy rule in Kennedy
was also rejected by the Arizona Supreme Court in Pool v. Superior Court, 677 P.2d 261
(Ariz. 1984).
178 State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1321 (Or. 1983). Continuing, the court noted that
often a defendant would raise only a federal claim. The court pointed out that exclusive
reliances on federal claims might foreclose any potential state law claims in the future. Fur-
ther, where counsel merely cited Oregon law, the court may ask counsel to either explain or
abandon the state issue. Id.
179 See P. Galie & L. Galie, supra note 168, at 286 n.75. (The authors suggest that in such
circumstances, the Supreme Court's opinion is advisory in retrospect only if the state court
negates the Court's opinion.); see a/so Bice, Anderson and the Adequate State Ground, 45 S. CAL. L.
REv. 750, 765 (1972) (considers potential impact in other cases).
180 672 P.2d 255 (Mont. 1983).
181 Id
182 103 S. Ct. 916 (1983).
183 195 Mont. 185, 637 P.2d 1 (1981), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 1418 (1983).
184 103 S. Ct. 1418 (1983). Justice Stevens dissented, quoting those portions of the state
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On remand, a newly-constituted Montana Supreme Court1 85
noted the Michigan v. Long "assumption," recognized that the major-
ity's first opinion injackson had cited pertinent provisions from the
Montana Constitution, and reviewed the various state cases it had
relied on in that opinion. It then concluded that the (first) Jackson
opinion had been based primarily on the federal constitution and
Supreme Court decisions.18 6 The Montana court therefore reconsid-
ered its earlier decision and modified it according to the holding in
South Dakota v. Neville. 187
Two Montana justices, however, filed sharp dissents.' 88 Both
echoed the theme of the arrogance and intrusiveness of the Supreme
Court in this case. 89 Justice Shea, the author of the first Jackson
opinion, admitted that he had been mistaken in that decision be-
cause he "did not recognize the extent to which the United States
Supreme Court stood ready to intrude on the judicial affairs of this
state in interpreting our own constitution."' 90 Justice Shea noted:
court decision which in his view demonstrated an independent and adequate state ground.
Id. at 1418-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
185 Between the first and secondJackson opinions, following remand by the Court, Justice
Daly, one of the justices in the majority on the first decision, was replaced by Justice Gul-
brandson. He joined three dissenters on the first case to form a new majority. 672 P.2d at
255, 260. Further, Justice Morrison, who had concurred with the majority in the first Jackson
decision, offered a special opinion concurring in the result; he stated that in the first decision
he was not concerned about independent state grounds. Id at 260. Although he disagreed
with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the fifth amendment, he felt bound to follow it
because the United States and state constitutional provisions are identical.
186 672 P.2d at 258.
187 Id at 259. Using the Supreme Court's model in South Dakota v. Neville as a template,
the court reconsidered its earlier decision and agreed that under federal law the evidence of
refusal to take the sobriety test was admissible. Id. at 258-59.
188 Both of these justices had been in the majority in the court's first decision injackson.
189 Justice Sheehy stated:
Instead of knuckling under to this unjustified expansion of federal judicial
power into the perimeters of our state power, we should show our judicial displea-
sure by insisting that in Montana, this sovereign state can interpret its constitution
to guarantee rights to its citizens greater than those guaranteed by the federal
constitution.
672 P.2d at 260 (Sheehy, J., dissenting). There is no need to "knuckle under" to the Supreme
Court. The states have the right to establish independent state grounds. The dissent's com-
plaint misses the mark because the Court in this case had not told the Montana court what
law to apply. It simply asked the court to clarify what law it had applied in its first decision.
Id at 256. The Oregon Supreme Court's "respectful" disagreement with the Supreme Court
in State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316 (Or. 1983). A state court or judge urging adoption of an
independent ground need not be disrespectful in the process.
190 672 P.2d at 262. Justice Shea further pointed to Chief Justice Burger's concurring
opinion in Florida v. Casal, 103 S. Ct. 3100 (1983), as representing the kind of philosophy
which he felt led to the remand in this case. In Casal, the Chief Justice had reminded the
citizens of Florida that the nonfederal ground which had required suppression of large quan-
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I suggest that the provisions of our own constitution do have
meaning independent of the interpretations given to the United
States Constitution, and that so long as we do not deny rights
guaranteed by the United States Constitution, we can and
should, where the situation arises, interpret our own constitution
to give more rights than those granted by the United States Con-
stituiton. But the majority has abdicated that responsibility by
holding that provisions of our constitution "substantially indenti-
cal" (whatever that means) with provisions of the United States
Constitution can get their meaning only from the United States
Supreme Court. It seems the majority has adopted the philoso-
phy suggested by Chief Justice Burger in Florida v. Casal, and
would permit the United States Supreme Court to tell us what
our state constitution means.191
Both of the dissents in Jackson, however, unfairly vented their
frustration at the Supreme Court instead of at the apparent cause of
the Montana court's changed position-a change in composition of
that court.1 9 2 The Supreme Court had simply asked the Montana
court to clarify the basis of its first decision.1 93 To say that the re-
quest amounted to an edict from the Supreme Court as to how to
read state law is a leap in logic. As noted in an earlier section, "re-
spect" is a question of degree. 194 What to some is a respectful request
for clarification is to others a personal and arrogant insult. 195
In Brown v. State,196 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recon-
sidered a case which the Supreme Court had reversed and remanded
on the issue of plain-view seizures. 19 7 The Court did not ask the
Texas court to clarify its decision,1 98 but on remand defense counsel
raised the question of whether the court had relied on Texas law in
its first decision, and if not, whether the Texas Constitution would
nonetheless provide an independent basis for that decision. The
Texas court, in a plurality opinion, noted that its first decision rested
squarely on the fourth amendment. 199 The court also declined to
read the Texas Constitution as being more protective than its federal
tities of marijuana could be changed through the legislative process. Id. at 3101-02 (Burger,
C.J., concurring).
191 672 P.2d at 264-65 (Shea, J., dissenting).
192 Set note 185 supra.
193 See notes 180-84 supra and accompanying text.
194 See notes 92-96 supra and accompanying text.
195 See, e.g., State v. Chrisman, 676 P.2d 419 (Wash. 1984), discussed in note 137 supra.
196 657 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)(en banc).
197 Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983).
198 The Court nonetheless briefly addressed the issue in rejecting the defendant's argu-
ment that the Texas court had relied on state grounds. 103 S. Ct. at 1537-38 n. 1.
199 657 S.W.2d at 798.
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counterpart. Although noting that under the state provision earlier
cases indicated that the defendant might have been entitled to
greater protection, the court reiterated its decision to interpret the
state constitution in harmony with the Supreme Court opinions. 200
The plurality's allegiance to the Supreme Court, however, failed
to gain full-fledged support from other judges. Both concurring and
dissenting opinions voiced concern about judicial abdication. 201
What these cases evidence is the true independence of the state
courts to decide whether to follow federal precedent or, if necessary,
forge state law. The states' responses have obviously been mixed.
Moreover, those state courts choosing to take an independent course
will not always find the path well-marked or smooth.
B. Role of the Courts and Counsel In the "New Federalism"
Just how state courts go about establishing more expansive state
law and meeting the Micigan v. Long plain statement rule will obvi-
ously vary from court to court. In some instances, a specific constitu-
tional or statutory provision will provide a worthy vehicle for state
courts' reliance on nonfederal grounds for their decisions.20 2 In the
absence of such provisions, the state court may revive earlier, dor-
mant state cases for a more expansive reading, as the Washington
Supreme Court did in Ringer v. State.203 Where there is no state pre-
cedent to rely on, the state court may forge new state law, perhaps
relying in part on more expansive lower federal court rulings, or dis-
senting opinions from the Supreme Court, or upon the state court's
supervisory powers. 204 Throughout this process, the state court must
be careful to specifically delineate both the authority it is relying
upon and the reasons for its reliance. If federal authorities are used
as a basis for developing independent state grounds, it is especially
important that the state court make it clear that it finds those au-
200 The Texas Court stated that it would follow that "path until such time as we are
statutorily or constitutionally mandated to do otherwise." Id. at 799.
201 Judge Teague's dissent was particularly sharp:
To the plurality's implicit holding that the members of this Court now have the
role of being nothing more than mimicking court jesters of the Supreme Court of
the United States, taps should be blown, and flags flown at half-mast-on behalf of
what was formerly a Court that was part of the independent appellate judiciary of
the State of Texas.
Id. at 810 (Teague, J., dissenting).
202 See Howard, supra note 1, at 934-940, for a number of sound suggestions for state
courts on where to look for independent state law.
203 See notes 169-74 supra and accompanying text.
204 See Howard, supra note 1, at 934-940.
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thorities to be persuasive guidance but that the federal law does not
compel the decision it is reaching.20 5 Ambiguous decisions may well
trigger application of the Michzgan v. Long "assumption." In short,
for those state courts choosing an expansive, independent, and ade-
quate state path, it is important that others reading the court's deci-
sion see the path clearly.
It is also important to recognize that the state courts do not
stand alone in choosing whether to base their decision on federal or
state grounds. Counsel can, and should, be conscious of the possibil-
ity of developing adequate state grounds. In many cases it is easier
for both counsel and judges simply to rely on the Supreme Court's
decisions, especially where there is little state law on the issue.206 It is
obviously more difficult to break or reopen a different trail. Again,
however, that task is not mandated by the Supreme Court; at most
the Court encourages states to do that. Just how counsel frame and
brief their respective positions will depend largely on the climate in
the state courts. Defense counsel, for example, in a criminal proceed-
ing should in most cases raise both federal and state grounds; a sym-
pathetic state court may provide an expansive state-ground ruling
and reject the federal ground. But the necessary groundwork for pos-
sible collateral relief in a federal court will have been laid.20 7
Some tactical choices remain even after the highest state court
has acted. If time permits, counsel should consider a request for re-
hearing or modification to clear up any ambiguous decisions which
do not clearly delineate between state and federal grounds.20 8 For
205 Although state courts may be well advised to make such plain statements in each case,
a one-time statement may be sufficient to cover future cases. See, e.g., State v. Kennedy, 295
Or. 260, 265, 666 P.2d 1316, 1321 (1983), discussed at note 178supra and accompanying text.
The Oregon Court apparently relied upon the one-time claim it made in Kennedy in two
subsequent decisions. See State v. Sparklin, 296 Or. 85, 672 P.2d 1182 (1983) (court addressed
both state and federal provisions on rights to counsel at interrogations and found no denial of
rights); State v. Mains, 295 Or. 640, 669 P.2d 1112 (1983)(court established state law require-
ment for warning a defendant about to undergo psychiatric questioning).
206 See State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1320 (Or. 1983), where the court recognizes that
"time for original analysis is scarce, particularly in the ordinary criminal case and particu-
larly at the trial level."
207 See O'Connor, supra note 2, at 802.
208 In State v. Kennedy, the court noted problems associated with reviewing a lower state
court opinion which relies only on federal grounds although state grounds were argued. The
Oregon Supreme Court stated:
[The] practice of deciding federal claims without attention to possibly decisive state
issues can create an untenable position for this state's system of discretionary
Supreme Court review. It can also waste a good deal of time and effort of several
courts and counsel and needlessly spur pronouncements by the United States
Supreme Court on constitutional issues of national importance in a case to whose
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instance, a defense counsel who has benefitted from a protective
state-ground decision by the state court should ensure that there can
be no mistake that the state court clearly relied on an independent
and adequate state ground, thus effectively precluding further review
by the Supreme Court,20 9 as long as the insulation from review is not
artificial.
C. Good Faith Insulation of State Court Decisions
Simply citing state grounds is not an absolute bar to Supreme
Court review. In Michzgan v. Long, the Court recognized this, stating
that it would not review a state decision if it clearly and expressly
stated that it was alternatively based both on federal grounds and on
"bona fide separate, adequate, and independent [state] grounds. 210
Thus, the Court has clearly signaled that in all cases coming before
it, it will remain as it always has, ultimately responsible for determin-
ing whether it has jurisdiction.2i1 Measuring for "bona fide"
nonfederal grounds is difficult but not unworkable. The Court will
be particularly sensitive to attempts by state courts to insulate review
and resolution of federal questions. 212 For example, state procedural
rules which serve as the nonfederal grounds and have prevented reso-
lution of a federal issue will be evaluated based on their legitimate
state interest.2t3 When it is not clear from the state decision just how
decision these may be irrelevant. In effect, when this court might reach the same
result under the Oregon law that a lower court reaches by citing federal precedents,
we would have to allow review at the instance of a losing party objecting only to the
federal holding, while the successful party who might prefer a decision on state
grounds has no reason to petition us for review. Surely a practice that requires a
winning party to seek review solely in order to shift a favorable judgment from
federal to state grounds is wholly unreasonable, apart from its logical flaws.
295 Or. 260, 263, 666 P.2d 1316, 1319 [footnote omitted]. In a footnote the court observed
that the same problem can occur when a trial court has relied on federal grounds and the
intermediate appellate court affirms without opinion. Id at 263 n.4, 666 P.2d at 1319 n.4.
209 See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3476 (1983).
210 Id.
211 Id. That is not to say, however, that state courts do not have anything to say about
whether a case will be reviewed. It does mean that the Supreme Court will determine
whether the state clearly stated independent and adequate state grounds which preclude
review.
212 State court "evasion" of Supreme Court decisions has been the subject of a number of
commentaries. See, e.g., Beatty, State Court Evasion of United States Supreme Court Mandates During
the Last Decade of the Warren Court, 6 VAL. U.L. REV. 260 (1972); Wilkes, The New Federalism in
Criminal Procedure Revisited, 64 Ky L.J. 729 (1976); Wilkes, More on the New Federalism in Criminal
Procedure, 63 Ky L.J. 873 (1975); Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court
Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421 (1974); Note, Evasion of Supreme Court Mandates in
Cases Remanded to State Courts Since 1941, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1251 (1954).
213 See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
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firm the state grounds are, the Court may properly probe deeper and
fall back into one of its earlier options of either asking the state court
for further clarification or examining the applicable state law to de-
termine whether it should assume jurisdiction. 214
IV. Impact of the Michigan v. Long Rule on State Criminal
Defendants
The Court's new rule appears to open the doors for state prose-
cutors who will succeed in convincing the Court to further whittle
away at the rights of state criminal defendants.21 5 As noted in an
earlier portion of this article, the new rule is not likely to change the
Court's underlying criteria for deciding which cases to hear; the por-
tion of the Court's expansion of Teny protective searches in Long
should not be confused with the Court's statements about dealing
with ambiguous state court decisions. Further, while the two Justices
most often associated with protecting criminal defendants' rights,
Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented on the merits, they did not
explicitly object to the new rule.2 16 Had they perceived the rule as a
danger to state criminal defendants, it seems safe to assume that they
would have expressly voiced their concern. Even Justice Stevens' dis-
sent focused primarily on the Court's "intrusion" into state
autonomy.
The perceptions that the Long rule will provide the vehicle for
further erosion of criminal defendants' rights is no doubt fueled in
part because Justice O'Connor, perceived as a conservative, authored
the opinion adopting the rule; but Justice O'Connor is also a former
state appellate judge who has long urged state courts to recognize
their valuable role as independent arbiters of state law. That, it
would seem, says much about whether the Court itself really sees the
Michigan v. Long rule as a sign of respect for state courts.2t 7
The Long rule does not signal a change in the proposition that
state courts may provide more protections for state criminal defend-
ants than those provided in the federal Constitution. It does remind
the states, however, that they may not expandfederal rights;218 when
they act like federal courts they will be reviewed as a federal court.
214 See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
215 See Justice Stevens' dissent, 103 S. Ct. at 3489.
216 See notes 73-78 supra and accompanying text.
217 One of the ironies in the area of the Supreme Court review of state court criminal law
decisions is that justices who may wish to hold the line on federal rights are also advocates of
state autonomy. The two views are not inconsistent.
218 Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975).
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But, it does not follow that the defendants' federal rights will always
be reduced.
Ironically, as a result of the Long rule, the state courts that here-
tofore were reversed on federal grounds may now expand state crimi-
nal defendants' rights on state grounds with little fear of reversal, as
long as they are clear and fair about it. What happens to state crimi-
nal defendants is still determined to a great extent by the way in
which the state court treats their arguments and by the grounds on
which the state court rests its decision.
Conclusion
Our federalist judicial system presents a delicate balance and
requires an ever-steady hand in weighing state autonomy and poten-
tial Supreme Court review. Tipping the balance toward respecting
state autonomy is less intrusive, but potentially casts state courts as
final arbiters of federal law. On the other hand, tipping the balance
toward the Supreme Court as final arbiter of federal law can
threaten to intrude on state autonomy. "Intrusion" in a federalist
scheme, however, is a two-way street. When the Supreme Court re-
views state court decisions potentially grounded on state law, it is
arguably intruding into a state court's autonomy. When a state
court decides federal issues in an expansive manner, it is potentially
intruding into the province of the Supreme Court and other federal
courts.
That potential tensions exist between federal and state courts is
clear. It is also clear that a workable and practical balance is needed.
That balance emerges from Michigan v. Long. The Court's new op-
tion for handling ambiguous state decisions which might rest on an
independent and adequate state ground is a reasonable rule. The
Long rule may cause some perceived "intrusion into the state auton-
omy," but that possibility existed even under pre-Azm'chian v. Long
practices. Considering the limited scope of the rule, the problems it
was designed to remedy, the compelling need for uniformity in fed-
eral law, and the minimal risks of rendering advisory opinions, the
rule makes good sense.
The new rule is not a panacea. It will not likely change any-
one's views about the role or posture of the Supreme Court. Its de-
tractors may well view it as another artificial attempt to impose
federal law on state courts. Staunch supporters of the Court will con-
tinue to swear allegiance to it. Nonetheless, regardless of one's ideo-
logical stance, there should be no doubt that the Court has given a
[1.984]
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practical and unmistakable signal to state courts: To avoid risks of
unnecessary plenary review, be as clear as possible in stating the
grounds for your judgments.
To date, the responses from the state courts have been mixed.
Whatever the response, state courts should remember that the Court
is not mandating how they decide state law questions, as long as they
do not infringe on federal rights. Rather, the Court has simply indi-
cated how it will react to ambiguous state court decisions. How state
courts react is their affair.
